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While the high church Presbyterians agreed with Hooker that the national church is one and indivisible, they totally differed from him in their estimate of the state. They were bitter opponents of the royal supremacy in things spiritual. They made a "necessary separation perpetual and personal between the Church and the Commonwealth." (Bk. VIII, chap. 1, § 2). But Hooker took Aristotle's noble conception of the state with the deepest seriousness. "The scope thereof is not simply to live, nor the duty so much to provide for life, as for the means of living well." (Bk. VIII, chap. 1, § 4.) The unity of England was his grand passion. In the service of England he sought to bring the ideal of the church and the ideal of the state within a single conception of law.

His book is a statesmanlike study of polity, not of ecclesiastical polity merely. His mental qualities are those of the statesman of the highest order, not those of the ecclesiastic or the theologian. He was lifted as far above his Presbyterian opponent as he stands above the modern Anglican ritualist who, without knowing it—heresy and history make strange bedfellows—is mentally close akin to the Rev. Walter Travers. It was a statesmanlike study of the ideal of law in its entirety and in relation to its divine source, which gave him his lofty position and wide outlook. His intellectual sanity and poise, his comprehensiveness, his eager search for the things that all Englishmen might hold in common, his abhorrence of sweeping generalization whether ecclesiastical or political, his insistence upon the "restraints and limitations" of abstract principles—all these qualities sprang from the same source. And this it is that verifies the truth of F. D. Maurice's fine description of him as representing so remarkably—more remarkably than any divine, perhaps than any English prose writer—that union of opposites in which the strength of the Elizabethan period lay, whatever seeds of weakness it might leave for the succeeding time.

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THE CHIEF END OF MAN.

THERE is a saying of Fichte's that the kind of philosophy a man chooses depends upon the kind of man he is. Every history of human thought in a greater or less measure justifies this saying. But if this is true of our intellectual attitude toward things, how much more must it be true of that complete response of the entire man to his total environment that we call religion. There is the same God and Father

of us all. But Jew and Gentile, Greek, and Barbarian, in seeking after him, if haply they may find him, meet with widely different adventures. The same gospel of Christ has been preached in ancient, mediæval and modern times, but the resulting forms of Christian life have varied greatly. We cannot expect, therefore, that amid all the changes in man's recent experience the form of the religious life is to remain unmoved. What then is the peculiar religious attitude of the present day? Professor Coe's work¹ is an answer to this question. He does not enter upon the kaleidoscopic forms of religiosity outside of the historical denominations, but he shows that a change is taking place within the church itself, and he describes in a masterly manner the character of the movement. Further, it is not so much the change in doctrines that interests him as "the transformation that is taking place in personal and practical religion, and in the modes of its propagation." (P. 5.)

In the first chapter the author gives a summary of the changed conditions which are most potent in determining present religious tendencies. "A developing humanity implies a developing religion." (P. 21.) First, then, what are the most significant of the recent developments of humanity? There are three main groups of these new influences.

The growth of science and the diffusion of knowledge have made great changes in man's general attitude toward the world.

Men have ceased to be afraid; . . . fears and mystical presentiments have been allayed; intellect has become self-confident and extraordinarily active; men boldly accept the responsibility of doubt and dissent; and authority, whether in doctrine or in practice, has largely yielded to individual opinion. (Pp. 22-5.)

A second significant factor in the life of the modern man is found in the new inventions and the unprecedented extension of man's control over nature. The ancients made many useful inventions, *e. g.*, the wheel, the harness, the sail, etc.

But none of these early triumphs of inventive genius inspired men with such a sense of superiority to nature and with such an ambition to control her forces, as is common-place with us. . . . To generate steam and electricity for our own use is to exercise an almost demiurgic authority. . . . This brilliantly successful appropriation of nature has added to our sense of the value of this life. We no longer feel that we are pilgrims and

¹ *The Religion of a Mature Mind*. By GEORGE ALBERT COE. Chicago: Revell, 1902. Pp. 442. \$1.35, *net*.

strangers. . . . The world belongs to us, and we propose to cultivate it and apply the produce of it to human ends. We are outgrowing the habit of longing for another world. . . . Thus our new control over nature gives us self-confidence, inspires a practical attitude toward all things, makes us this-worldly rather than other-worldly, and gives zest and buoyancy to the work of the world. (Pp. 26-9.)

A third group of new influences that act upon the modern man comes from the growth of popular government and of the social consciousness. Freed from the fear of nature, and the bonds of extraneous political authority, the average man grows restive under all religious authority that is imposed from without.

The democratic spirit leads the individual to look within himself for his "must" and his "ought." . . . The wave of democracy has, indeed, thrown the individual back upon himself. But, striving to be himself, he discovers that no man lives to himself; that the center of gravity of his own life lies outside him as a mere individual. The next step will be to try whether the social sense can realize its ends without likewise transferring its center from men considered as finite, temporary phenomena, into some eternal divine world. Surely, to start the movement from pure individualism toward this goal involves no small gain to religion. . . . Possibly, in the age that is dawning God will make of the newly invigorated social sense a chief instrument of his own self-revelation. (Pp. 30-33.)

In these three groups of influences Professor Coe finds the chief factors which differentiate the modern man from his forefathers. The rest of the book sets forth the consequent development in the modern man's religion. It is pointed out that there is a large religious element in the scientific spirit itself.

The most characteristic thing about modern science, in fact, is not its wonderful insight into the constitution of the universe, but rather its spirit of self abnegation and of devotion to ideal good. . . . The consecration of the modern intellect to ideal aims should be recognized as a religious phenomenon. A really scientific age cannot be also a materialistic age, for science does not worship things, but ideals. Its passion is for truth, and truth is a temple of which the senses are only the vestibule. . . . The passion for truth is nothing less than a dim and partially developed act of worship toward the God of truth. (Pp. 53-5.)

The writer might have cited the example of Huxley, whose letters show a genuinely religious attitude toward truth.

But while science is religious, it is still more important for the modern mind that religion be scientific. Science has taught us to put everything to the empirical test. The religion which is to satisfy the

demands of today must meet this test without denying the validity of the traditional method for former times. Professor Coe urges :

Rightly or wrongly the men of this generation do not feel sure of the older method. If I mistake not, the unrest of the time is less a revolt against the content of traditional beliefs than anxiety to find some way of being sure of something. . . . In other matters men begin with the observed fact . . . Why not make the experiment of treating religious experience in the same way? . . . Here, it seems to me, the need for the new attitude is most pressing. For if there be a God, we ought to find Him by some method more accessible to the common man than speculation can be. It would be suffocating to practical religion to make God's presence an inference rather than an experience, to think that He should have spoken to man in the past but be silent now, or that he should talk to us through documents or proxies without responding to our own advances. What the hungry heart of our time needs is experience of an original, present relation to divine things. . . . This is the truly conservative stand-point. For experience, whether religious or other, is relatively abiding, while our reasonings about it are relatively shifting. . . . Not by declining the canons of modern thought, in short, but by working them to the extent of their capacity, is religious thought to adjust itself to the modern world." (Pp. 62-9.)

But how can the empirical method be applied to religion? The same fundamental method has to be applied differently in different fields. The methods of astronomy are not those of botany, and the methods of economics are widely different from either, yet all are empirical. One might wish that the author had stated more explicitly the form which the empirical method must take in its application to religion. There is a subtle danger here which has often proved a pit-fall in the past. The scientific method can lead only to delusion (or deception) if used unscientifically. An appeal to experience may turn out to be only a veil for dogmatism. While the writer does not stop to explain and justify the method in words, his actual use of the method in later chapters offers a strong vindication of it. The sincerity of his appeal to facts is manifest in the fourth chapter whose subject is "Some Things that We Know." These things that we know are, to use the author's words condensed, (1) that in each of us there is a higher and a lower set of tendencies ; (2) that these higher tendencies, as far as related to our fellows, find their best interpretation in the law of brotherly love ; (3) that whether or not there is a loving God, there ought to be one. "In a world in which love is the law for men, there ought to be a loving God. . . . Brotherly love is final for us provided it is thus final for the whole universe of which we

are parts. The reasonableness of any moral principle rests upon its harmony with the nature of things as they are." (4) The men who have applied in practical life the hypothesis of a God who is our Father have found their belief in it strengthened through experience. In so far as hypothesis is demonstrated by showing its correspondence with a considerable body of growing experience, we find in these facts a verification of the hypothesis of the existence of God. Life is interaction with reality. A belief that experience proves to be livable cannot fail then to be true, our author seems to argue.

We may admit the validity of this argument as a vindication of faith, even if we realize its incompleteness as a speculative demonstration. The theory of epicycles enabled the ancient astronomers to predict eclipses, but it was not true. The workable is not then always the true. But still the longer the period and the broader the field in which the theory works, the more reasonable is our confidence in it. Professor Coe is sound in affirming that: "The growing experience of the race, and the accumulated testimony of the Christian centuries, have a right to be heard, when the question of God's existence or of his loving fatherhood is raised." (P 127.) We need only observe, however, that the outcome of the appeal to experience is a reasonable faith rather than a rational proof. Perhaps this is all Professor Coe means to claim. The modern mind is becoming more and more convinced that such a faith is enough for practical religion, however much theology and philosophy may yearn for proof. There are two kinds of agnosticism, the one is anti-religious, the other pro-religious. The first says, We know only phenomena; the ultimate ground of reality is unknowable; let us then waste no thought or energy on the transcendent world. Science is all the knowledge possible for us, and religion is but superstition. The pro-religious agnostic starts from the same premises — we know only phenomena, and the ultimate ground of unreality is unknowable; but for him life is more than thought. We are not bound to confine our ethical strivings and our spiritual aspirations within the limits of our intellectual grasp. Let us then exercise a practical faith in the objects which our moral and our religious nature demand. Let us live as in God's sight, even if we cannot demonstrate his existence to our limited intellects. Men of science cannot refrain from philosophizing and theologizing any more than anyone else. During the last half century there has been a tendency of thought in the scientific world from materialism to agnosticism and from the anti-religious type of

agnosticism to the pro-religious type. Romanes is an interesting example of one who in his own person experienced the change from the anti- to the pro-religious form of agnosticism. Many recent philosophical writers take in one shape or another the Kantian position of epistemological agnosticism and practical faith. Paulsen, James, and Baldwin might be mentioned as examples. The significance of Professor Coe's book seems to me to lie in the fact that he writes not as a man of science or philosophy who stands outside of the church and seeks the truth independent of all historical religion; he writes rather from within the church as a lover of the historical faith who finds that its natural development and present movement is in the line of modern thought.

If from the quotations already given it would seem that the writer found the scientific spirit to be the chief determinant of the present religious movement, in other chapters we see a no less emphatic recognition of the influence of the social spirit. The old religion is dogmatic and individual, the new is empirical and social. The change from the individual to the social point of view is brought out in the chapter on "The Chief End of Man." To glorify God and enjoy him forever used to be understood in a perfectly individualistic sense. Put baldly, the thought was that the Creator likes to be praised and worshiped; men want to go to heaven; an exchange is effected whereby each secures what he desires. Such a view assumes that both God and men are actuated by self-regarding motives, and further it belittles this life into a mere stage of probation for the future. Selfishness and "other-worldliness" went hand in hand. A few quotations will show Professor Coe's interpretation of the new thought:

The Christian conception of life is all contained in that of the Kingdom of God. This kingdom is at once an internal, organizing principle, and the resulting external organization. This organization embraces the life that now is and that which is to come. Its motive power is love to God and to men, and this is not an individualistic but a social motive. The older conception of the Christian life was ruled by the notion of securing personal salvation; the motive was assumed to be self-regarding. If the term salvation is slipping out of use, the chief reason is probably the fact that a better understanding of the mind of Christ has made it impossible for us to accept the selfish motive which that term implied. . . . Christian self-denial has a positive, not a negative aim, and this positive aim is social. . . . Christianity is not self-suppression, but self-realization. . . . The end of the individual life is a perfected community life. . . . Individualism defeats itself because men are not and cannot be mere individuals, cannot save their lives by any

possible self-seeking. . . . The vital principle of all the churches will ultimately require of all of them that they surrender their own individualism in order to found a world-wide, visible fellowship. . . . Even now democracy's proclamation that government exists for the good of the governed goes a long way toward identifying its functions with those of the Kingdom of God. . . . Glorifying God consists in uniting ourselves with him in heart and work, to produce an ideal human race. . . . Individualism no more expresses the life of God than it describes the real life of men. God, as well as man, is a social being. . . . Is it our end to enjoy God forever? Yes, but not as compensation for our obedience to him. It is a sign of moral health that men have so largely ceased to be interested in the question of rewards and punishments. We are not to be good in order to gain bliss or to escape misery. The future life is not a device for getting even with men, or for reinforcing the motives to goodness, or for patching up a universe that is rather badly put together. Nor is this life a mere vestibule to real living. Rather, this life and the future life are one life (pp. 168-84).

Professor Coe touches upon a thought here which has been more explicitly developed by Professor Höffding, the well-known Danish philosopher, in his recent work on the philosophy of religion. Speaking of the tendency of the religious consciousness to regard one period of life as a mere means for another, he says :

Means and end are sundered, and life is divided between joyless labor and laborless enjoyment. Time is filled in great part by something that possesses worth only in its effects. Every forward step in the art of education, in ethics, and sociology² depends upon overcoming this dualism, the most distressing of all dualisms. . . . This is overcome if the labor and the development themselves possess immediate worth, and so themselves become ends or parts of an end. . . . It then becomes possible in the midst of time to live in eternity.³

In the chapter on "The Consciousness of Sin" the social point of view is again to the front. The sense of sin, our author tells us, has become a less prominent factor in the Christian consciousness. There are several reasons for this. We no longer test life by doctrine, but doctrine by life.

Now, the old-fashioned experience of the sense of sin was largely a factitious produce of the ruling theory of sin. . . . A second reason for the decline of the sense of sin is, that the terrors of the law appealed to motives not high enough to move the modern conscience profoundly. The personal salvation which men were exhorted to seek is a purely individualistic good. A third reason why the sense of sin has grown comparatively weak is found

² He might have added religion too, if Professor Coe's interpretation be true.

³ *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 50.

in the modern tendency to emphasize positive good in every sphere of life. The Christian consciousness is moving toward a point where the supreme question of life will be not, "Am I saved?" but, "What am I good for?" Not, "Does God pardon and accept me?" but, "How can I contribute most to the progress of the Kingdom of God?" Along with the decreasing sense of sin comes an increasing sense of personal responsibility. Is it not possible that as our sense of the positive content of the Christian life grows, it crowds out the sense of those negative impulses that gather about the thought of actual or possible guilt? Instead of being a retrograde movement then, is not the declining consciousness of sin the displacement of a lower by a higher type of Christian experience? (p. 383).

But the book is not only a survey of religion as it is. It is also in a large measure the author's view of what religion ought to be. This is not, however, a merely personal view; it is based very largely on his studies in the psychology of religion. While the results of these studies are especially manifest in the chapters on "The Breadth of Religious Experience," and "Are Conversions Dying out?" the book, as a whole, may be regarded as a first fruit of the present interest in the psychological study of religious experience. I believe that practical religion has much to learn from this new branch of psychology. Indeed we can hardly realize yet what is likely to be the fruit in the religious field of the newer study of psychology in general. Where people have spoken in the past of the relation between science and religion they have generally had in mind mainly, if not wholly, the physical sciences. These sciences have revealed the reign of natural law. We have come to see that the true evidence in nature of God's existence is not to be found in the exceptional, the abnormal, the terrible, the occurrence that cannot be explained. Were this the case, we should have to admit that science is gradually driving God from the universe—but, on the contrary, the real manifestation of God is in the law, order, harmony, and unity of nature. Every advance of science conquers so much more territory for God. The rationality of nature is the best evidence that its author is a rational being. Now I believe that our study of the mental sciences is bound to lead to a somewhat analogous result in the subjective world. Special, abnormal, unusually intense, and inexplicable mental experiences have often been regarded as direct evidence of the divine presence. But as Professor Coe points out, such testimony must be reweighed in the light of recent psychological conclusions. Our present knowledge of the susceptibility of the mind to hallucinations, hypnotism, and various forms of suggestion, compel the thoughtful mind to a new study of the claims

of the saints and other religious geniuses to immediate experiences of the divine. Such experiences in the past have been explained either by the faithful as immediate revelations from God, or by the doubters as pure fictions. Modern psychology is satisfied with neither of these explanations. Its present tendency, at any rate, is to accept such occurrences as genuine subjective experiences, but to explain them by the natural laws of the mind without reference to supernatural interference. As the physical sciences have changed our attitude toward the miracle in the objective world, so the progress of mental sciences is likely to change our attitude toward special religious experiences in the subjective world. But in the latter case as in the former we may well believe that the change of base from the special to the general will lead only to a broader and more solid foundation for the faith.

There is no thoughtful observer, I believe, who will deny that Professor Coe's book describes an actual movement in the religious life of the modern church. Whether it be the main stream of advance, or only a temporary eddy, whether these views be wholesome or pernicious, the intelligent religious student and worker must take account of the tendency, for it is a very real one. I have tried as far as possible in this review to let the book speak for itself. But the quotations selected to show the content have not done full justice, I fear, to the spirit. Particularly to be noticed is the author's constant recognition of the worth of the old. If the present is the better, it is so because it is the fruitage of the good of the past. The book is a noteworthy contribution to constructive religious thought.

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BRIEF STUDIES IN NEW TESTAMENT HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

THERE is nothing more characteristic of recent literature in the New Testament field than its tendency toward biography. Even when he passes into the field of biblical theology, the New Testament student seems determined to work outward from the inner life of Jesus and Paul. Works of introduction are at present being quite outclassed in number and importance by those which seek to discover the true significance of Jesus and Paul in the light of their times and experiences. It is therefore not surprising to find the "Rationalist Press Association, Limited" publishing a new edition of *Supernatural Religion*.¹ This

¹*Supernatural Religion: An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.* London: Watts & Co., 1902. xvi + 920 pages.